Black Box Version 1.0 Manual de usuario Pagina 26

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Evil Lackey
Change:
“Hotel” to “Office”
“Maid” to “Passed-over Deputy to the Deputy”
“Hotel Bar” to “Office Gym”
• Advantages:
Longer time-frame for attack
Better understand MDM setup in use
With patience, can execute attack w/out DFU
MITM target device
Wait for legit server to send push notifications
Fixes?
• Better use of SSL
Remember certificates (connections, commands)
• Require user acknowledgment for re-enroll
So tokens don’t get sent silently
An alternative attack can take place within the office environment itself.
This may actually have several advantages over the “Traveling CEO”
attack, in particular since the attacker will have more regular, long-term
access to the device, so the attack need not be rushed.
Also, if the attacker is able to better understand how the MDM system is
configured at that site (especially if they have their own device they can
experiment and test with), it might even be possible to execute the
attack without the complexities of the DFU Tethered Boot trick. Simply
acquire the enrollment profile directly from the MDM server, set up a
MITM server that forwards all non-target MDM traffic to the real server,
and then wait for the real server to send out regularly scheduled
commands. (If, for example, you discover that the server refreshes
device information every Monday night at 8, then just time your attack
for then and let the MDM server cause the target device to poll your
MITM server).
Fortunately, I think that fixes to this (and other MDM issues) can be
pretty easily accomplished by Apple.
Better use of SSL-based authentication, both at the client to server
level, and at the command level, would also raise the bar for MITM
attacks. Finally, whenever the device enrolls in MDM (and thus sends an
Unlock Token to a 3rd party), the user should be directly notified,
especially if the device already appears to be enrolled.
It’d probably be nice to add some kind of authentication to the
EraseDevice call...perhaps requiring the UnlockToken. Though there
may be valid reasons why the current method was chosen.
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